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Wetenschappelijk artikel
in its reply to the green Paper on family reunification, the dutch government 
proposed some controversial amendments. does it make the Netherlands 
the black sheep in the european herd? mark klaassen en johanne 
søndergaard  analyzed the data and conclude that  the Netherlands 
does not stand completely alone in its views. chances are thin, however, 
that the dutch restrictive proposals will become reality any time soon.  
O
n 15 November 2011 the European Commission 
(hereafter “the Commission”) published its Green 
Paper on the right to family reunification.1 This 
started a public consultation in which the Commis-
sion gathered the opinions of the member states and civil soci-
ety on perceived problems in the implementation of Directive 
2003/86 on the right to family reunification (hereafter “the 
Directive).2 The Commission posed fourteen questions to stake-
holders, which could submit their written responses until 1 
March 2012.3 The Dutch government submitted a reply to the 
Commission’s Green Paper, in which it gave its broad view on 
family reunification policy and answered the questions asked 
by the Commission. In its contribution, the Dutch government 
proposes some controversial amendments of the Directive, 
which would make the rules on family reunification stricter. 
1 com(2011)735 final, green Paper on the right to family reunification of 
third-country nationals living in the european union (directive 2003/86/ec, 
ve03001574).
2 council directive 2003/86/ec of 22 september 2003 on the right to family 
reunification. OJ L251/12, ve03001574.
3 see for an analysis of the green Paper, m. klaassen, g. lodder & P. 
rodrigues, groenboek gezinshereniging, Asiel & Migrantenrecht 1, 2012, 
ve12000463.
In order to find out whether the Netherlands stands alone in 
this respect, or whether there is an emerging consensus in 
taking a more restrictive stance on family reunification, the 
research question addressed in this article is how the Dutch 
response to the Green Paper compares to the contributions of 
other member states. 
After a short background of the Green Paper in Section 1, the 
methodology of the research is outlined in Section 2. Section 3 
gives an overview of the Dutch response compared to the other 
countries’ responses and in Sections 4-9 six selected issues are 
analysed in greater depth. In Section 10, one of the findings on 
substantive recommendations without evidence is discussed 
in detail. The future of the Directive is discussed in Section 11, 
before the concluding remarks in Section 12. 
1 Background of the Green Paper
After more than three years of negotiations, the Family 
Reunification Directive (2003/86) entered into force in 2003. 
From the beginning of the negotiations, there was friction 
between the Commission and the member states on a num-
ber of issues.4 The Commission pushed for a regime similar 
4 see t. strik, Besluitvorming over asiel- en migratierichtlijnen: de wisselwerking 
tussen nationaal en Europees niveau, den haag: Boom juridische uitgevers, 
2011, chapter 3.
How the Dutch response to the Commission’s Green Paper on Family 
Reunification compares to the reactions of other member states
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to the family reunification rules covering mobile EU citizens 
(Directive 2004/38) which would apply to both third coun-
try nationals and immobile EU citizens. The member states 
could not agree on for example the extension of the scope 
of the Directive to include immobile EU citizens, a common 
definition of the family and the degree of protection that 
should be given to cross-border family relations.5 The member 
states aimed to preserve a wide margin of discretion. At the 
time when the Directive was being negotiated, the role of the 
European Parliament was limited to consultation, restricting 
the influence of the Parliament on the decision-making pro-
cess. When finally a compromise was reached, the initial pro-
posals of the Commission were significantly adjusted by the 
member states, resulting in a low level of harmonisation with 
the Directive setting only minimum standards.6 The scope of 
the Directive was moreover limited to third country nationals. 
The European Parliament challenged the Directive in front of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘the Court’) claim-
ing that some of the provisions of the Directive were incompat-
ible with fundamental rights. In its ruling, the Court rejected 
the action by the Parliament, but did lay down principles on 
the interpretation of the Directive.7 For instance, the Court es-
tablished that the Directive grants a subjective right to family 
reunification.8 When the Court delivered its ruling on a pre-
liminary reference by a Dutch court regarding the level of the 
income requirement, the Court made clear that the purpose 
of the Directive is to promote family reunification. The right 
to family reunification may be subject to the conditions of the 
Directive, but since family reunification is the general rule, 
these conditions should be interpreted strictly. 9 
The Directive requires the Commission to periodically report 
on the implementation of the Directive in the member states 
and to propose amendments to the Directive when required.10 
When the Commission published an implementation report in 
2008, it noticed that some member states had applied derogato-
ry clauses concerning administrative fees, the waiting period, 
income requirements and integration measures in a too broad 
way, going against the effet utile of the Directive.11 In the report, 
the Commission further announced the publication of a Green 
5 see for example a. walter, Familienzusammenführung in Europa: Völkerrecht, 
Gemeinschaftsrecht, Nationales Recht, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009, p. 166-
171.
6 k. groenendijk, r. fernhout, d. van dam, r. van oers & t. strik, The Family 
Reunification Directive in EU Member States: the First Year of Implementation, 
Nijmegen: wolf legal Publishers, 2007, p. 62.
7 case c-540/03 European Parliament v Council [2006] ecr i-5769, 
ve06000854.
8 ibid., para. 60, ve06000854.
9 case c-578/08 Chakroun v Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken [2010] ecr 
i-1839, para. 43, jv 2010/77, m. nt. c.a. groenendijk, ve10000350.
10 article 19 family reunification directive.
11 com(2008)610 final, report from the commission to the european 
Parliament and the council on the application of directive 2003/86/ec on the 
right to family reunification, p. 14, ve08001724.
Paper to start a public consultation on the future of the family 
reunification regime.12
It took three years after the announcement for the Commission 
to finally publish the Green Paper on family reunification 
in 2011. In the Green Paper, the Commission decided not to 
address the issue of the future of the Directive. Instead the 
Commission aimed to gather the views of all stakeholders on 
selected issues in family reunification policies. In anticipa-
tion of the Green Paper, the Netherlands published a Position 
Paper on EU migration policy, in which family reunification 
has a prominent role.13 The Netherlands was the only mem-
ber state to take such an initiative. In the position paper, the 
Netherlands, among other proposals, called for the possibil-
ity to require family migrants to comply with more stringent 
substantive requirements on income and integration. When 
the Commission published the Green Paper, the Dutch gov-
ernment formally replied to the request of the Commission 
to put forward the Dutch positions. In its contribution, the 
Dutch government repeated the standpoints formulated in 
the Position Paper, as well as answering the specific questions 
asked by the Commission.
2 Methodology
The documentation used to examine the relation between the 
response of the Dutch government and the replies of the other 
member states are the 24 available written responses from 
the member states14 and the summary report drafted by the 
Commission.15 
The Dutch contribution went beyond the questions asked by 
the Commission, as it also provided a general reflection on 
EU family reunification policy. For example the issue of fam-
ily reunification under Directive 2004/38 was not discussed 
in the Green Paper, but plays an important role in the Dutch 
contribution. This article only considers the Dutch answers to 
the Commission’s questions in the Green Paper, because the 
other member states hardly mention any of the additional is-
sues raised by the Dutch government and therefore it is not 
possible to compare these Dutch proposals with the views the 
other governments express in their contribution to the public 
consultation. Ireland,16 Slovenia and Spain have not submitted 
12 ibid., p. 15, ve08001724.




14 all written responses can be accessed at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-
affairs/what-is-new/public-consultation/2012/consulting_0023_en.htm. 
15 european commission dg home affairs, summary of stakeholder responses 
to the green paper on the right to family reunification of third-country natio-
nals, 2012, available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-is-new/
public-consultation/2012/pdf/0023/summary_of_stakeholder_responses_
en.pdf.
16 in the summary report by the european commission the irish position is men-
tioned at several questions. however on the website of the commission there 
is no irish contribution available. the commission has not (yet) been able to 
confirm or reject the existence of an irish contribution.
The Court of Justice made clear that the purpose of the Directive is to promote 
family reunification.
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a reply to the Green Paper, and are therefore excluded from 
the analysis. The reactions from Denmark and the United 
Kingdom in the analysis here, even though through opt-outs 
the Directive is not applicable in these member states. The rea-
son for this decision is that in a possible renegotiation of the 
Directive, these member states would play their normal role 
in the decision-making process, even though the same opt-out 
may still apply in a revised directive.
In order to systematically analyse the twenty-four responses to 
the fourteen questions, a coding scheme was developed. The 
fourteen questions were divided into sub-questions, in order 
for the coding to capture as much of the information in the 
reports as possible. The categories are based on the standpoints 
of the member states on the future of the relevant Directive 
provision. The five categories used are: ‘Stay the same’, ‘Change 
– to be more restrictive’, ‘Change – to be less restrictive’, 
‘Clarification’ and ‘No answer’. ‘Restrictive’ in the coding re-
fers to the effect the proposed amendment would have on ap-
plicants for family reunification. ‘Clarification’ is used when 
a member state argues that the Directive provision is unclear 
and suggests that it should be clarified, for example through 
interpretative guidelines. Four of the sub-questions do not ad-
dress potential changes to the Directive, but address rather 
whether the member state can provide evidence of certain 
problems. This is the case for the questions on forced mar-
riages, on the effectiveness of integration measures, on fraud 
and on marriages of convenience. For these questions, two cat-
egories were used: ‘yes, evidence’ and ‘no evidence’. For these 
questions, the ‘no answer’ category was not used; if countries 
did not mention any evidence, it was coded as ‘no evidence’. For 
all questions, notes were included in the table on the reasoning 
behind the coding. 
After an initial pilot test of the scheme using the government 
response reports from the Netherlands, Portugal and the 
United Kingdom, a few adjustments were made, including ex-
panding the list of sub-questions to twenty-four (see Appendix 
A for the full list of sub-questions) and developing a series of 
instructions for the remaining coding. The reports in French 
(Belgium, France and Luxembourg) and Italian (Italy) were 
read and coded by French- and Italian speaking colleagues.
Both authors read and coded all remaining country reports.17 
When all twenty-four reports had been coded, the answers 
were examined for possible inconsistencies, using the reason-
ing notes, the country reports and the European Commission’s 
summary report.18 Table B1 in Appendix B shows the coding of 
countries’ responses. 
17  except the austrian country report, which was only coded by the author who 
reads german. 
18 to see the completed spreadsheet of codes with reasoning notes, please 
contact the authors. 
The coding of the different answers to the Green Paper ques-
tions formed the basis of answering the research question of 
the relation between the Dutch response and the responses 
of the other member states. One approach to answering the 
research question using this coding scheme could be to sys-
tematically categorise countries by the level of restrictiveness 
suggested by their answers (e.g. comparing the number of 
questions for each country where the response called for more 
restrictive measures in the Directive). Because of the lack of 
depth that this type of analysis would allow, the categorisation 
of all countries based on countries’ answers to all of the Green 
Paper’s questions was deemed infeasible and undesirable for 
answering the research question. A methodology was there-
fore developed to ensure an overview of the relations between 
the Dutch response and other responses as well as an in-depth 
discussion of some key questions. Questions were selected for 
further in-depth analysis by developing and employing a case-
selection technique. The selection was intended to ensure a 
discussion of questions with the two key characteristics that 
help answer the research question: the type of response of the 
Netherlands (Directive to be more restrictive, less restrictive or 
stay the same19), coupled with the position of the Netherlands 
versus all other countries (whether the Dutch position is in a 
majority20 or minority21). 
Making a selection of questions does mean that not all issues 
in the Green Paper would be discussed in the paper. To partly 
remedy this, it was therefore decided that each question se-
lected would be discussed alongside all related sub-questions. 
This also allowed for depth and context to the analysis of each 
issue. In question-selection, priority was given to questions 
that included related evidence/no-evidence sub-questions. This 
was done in order to include in the discussion, the expected 
dynamics between the evidence questions and the substantive 
questions (see below). Questions with contingent sub-ques-
tions were selected with priority to represent categories where 
change to the Directive was advocated, as opposed to where no 
change was advocated.
The most common category of agreement (for eight questions) 
was where the Netherlands suggested that the Directive should 
stay the same and where a majority of countries agreed with 
the Netherlands (see footnote 22). This gave an early indication 
that the Netherlands may not be deviant in its answers. Even 
when the above-mentioned selection criteria were used, there 
were still four questions remaining for selection in this cat-
19 Because there are very few cases where countries wanted clarification, these 
questions were not included in the question-selection.
20 a majority is defined as 50% or more of countries that answered the question 
(i.e. countries coded as ‘no answer’ were not included) fell into the same 
category as the Netherlands.
21 a minority is defined as less than 50% of countries that answered the ques-
tion (i.e. countries coded as ‘no answer’ were not included) fell into the same 
category as the Netherlands.
The Dutch contribution went beyond the questions asked by the Commission, as 
it also provided a general reflection on EU family reunification policy.
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egory. The question with the highest level of agreement that 
the Directive should stay the same was then selected. This 
was question 4 on the definition of the family, where 90% of 
countries that answered the question agreed that the Directive 
should stay the same. Using this necessary additional selection 
criterion in this category enabled the analysis to examine 
the most extreme case of the category of agreement with the 
Netherlands on the Directive staying the same.
Out of the twenty substantive questions, six questions, with 
their related sub-questions, were thus selected based on the 
above criteria. Below are the selected questions of each catego-
ry, as well as a note on the section in the article where the ques-
tion will be discussed. If there were more questions to choose 
from in a category, the questions that were not selected are 
listed in the footnotes. 
1 Dutch government argues for the Directive to stay the same 
and…
 a.  A majority of countries agree with the Dutch position on 
this issue. Question selected: a wider definition of the 
family (Q4),22 discussed in Section 4; 
 b.  A minority of countries agree with the Dutch position on 
this issue Question selected: rules on fraud (Q10)23, dis-
cussed in Section 5.
2 Dutch government argues for the Directive to be more re-
strictive and…
 c.  A majority of countries agree with the Dutch position on 
this issue Question selected: the effectiveness of integra-
tion measures to facilitate integration (Q5), discussed in 
Section 6;
 d.  A minority of countries agree with the Dutch position 
on this issue. Question selected: the effectiveness of an 
age requirement to combat forced marriages (Q2),24 dis-
cussed in Section 7.
3 Dutch government argues for the Directive to be less re-
strictive and…
 e.  A majority of countries agree with the Dutch position on 
this issue. Question selected: subsidiary protection and 
family reunification (Q8) discussed in Section 9;
 f.  A minority of countries agree with the Dutch position on 
this issue. Question selected: refugees and family reuni-
fication (Q9), discussed in Section 10.
22 Questions not selected: 
 Q5b – integration measures at eu level; 
 Q9a – favourable provisions for refugees; 
 Q9c – refugees providing evidence; 
 Q12 – administrative fees; 
 Q13 – administrative deadline; 
 Q14 – horizontal clauses. 
23 Questions not selected:
 Q3 – standstill clause on children older than 15; 
 Q6 – three-year waiting period.
24 Questions not selected: 
 Q1a –reasonable prospect for the right of permanent residence;
 Q10c – regulating rules of interviews at eu level.
3  Dutch positions compared to other member 
states
The Netherlands is the only country that answered all ques-
tions posed by the Commission. In 12 out of the 20 substantive 
questions, the view held by the Netherlands is the most com-
mon view among all member states. In 8 out of 20 questions, 
the Netherlands is in a minority position. This gives another 
indication that the position of the Netherlands is not consis-
tently deviant from other member states. 
In 5 out of 20 questions the Netherlands express that they 
would like to make the Directive more restrictive for fam-
ily reunification applicants. In 4 out of these 5 questions, the 
Netherlands is in a minority position. The questions in which 
the Netherlands expresses the wish to make the Directive 
more restrictive are the questions on the reasonable prospect 
of permanent residence as a requirement for family reunifica-
tion, the age requirement, the pre-entry integration measures, 
measures to combat fraud at the EU level and measures to 
combat marriages of convenience. The Netherlands is only sup-
ported by other member states in its wish to be able to require 
applicants for family reunification to comply with pre-entry 
integration measures. 
In 3 out of 20 questions, the Netherlands proposed amend-
ments which would make the Directive less restrictive. In 2 of 
these 3 cases, the Dutch view is supported by a majority of the 
member states. Only the Dutch government’s wish to adapt the 
Directive in order to create a more inclusive definition of the 
family for holders of international protection, is not shared 
by a majority of the member states. The questions in which 
the Netherlands expressed the view to make the Directive less 
restrictive are the questions on the inclusion of subsidiary pro-
tection holders within the scope of the Directive, the regime 
that should apply to subsidiary protection holders and the wid-
ening of the definition of the family for the family reunifica-
tion of holders of international protection. 
In 11 out of 20 questions, the Netherlands argued that the 
Directive should remain unchanged. In only 2 out of these 11 
cases, the Dutch view is this not supported by a majority of the 
member states. In 1 out of 20 questions, on the validity of a resi-
dence permit, the Netherlands requested clarification. This po-
sition was only supported by three other countries (CY, EE, RO).
In four questions – concerning the age requirement and forced 
marriages, the effectiveness of integration measures, fraud 
and marriage of convenience – the Commission requested 
stakeholders to provide evidence instead of a substantive view 
on the Directive. An overwhelming majority of the member 
states did not provide any evidence. The Netherlands provided 
evidence on the effectiveness of the age requirement to com-
bat forced marriages, the effectiveness of integration mea-
sures to facilitate integration and fraud. Only on the question 
Groenboek gezinshereniging
Strikingly, none of the member states quote comprehensive statistical data 
concerning the occurrence of fraud.
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on marriage of convenience did the Netherlands not provide 
any evidence. A closer look at the evidence provided by the 
Netherlands and, where applicable, the other member states 
is necessary to assess whether the evidence provided is mean-
ingful evidence for the problem put forward for discussion 
by the Commission. In the following section this is done for 
both the effectiveness of the age requirement to combat forced 
marriages, fraud and the effectiveness of pre-entry integration 
measures to facilitate integration. Tables with an overview of 
the answers to the questions marriages of convenience, fraud 
and the effectiveness of pre-entry integration measures to fa-
cilitate integration can be found in Appendix B (Tables B2-B4).
4 A wider definition of the family 
The scope of the Directive is currently limited to the core fam-
ily, while the member states retain the competence to extend 
the scope of the Directive to wider categories of family mem-
bers. In question 4 the Commission asks whether the rules on 
the eligible family members are adequate and broad enough to 
take into account different definitions of the family other than 
the nuclear family. 
A large majority of the member states feel that the defini-
tion of the family as currently laid down in the Directive is 
sufficiently wide. Out of the 24 member states, 20 countries 
answered this question. Out of these 20 countries, 18 would 
like to keep the current eligibility provisions unaltered. For 
example the Netherlands believes the current wording of the 
Directive is adequate and broad enough and feels that it should 
remain up to the discretion of the member states to allow for 
the family reunification of family members outside the core 
family. Romania is the only member states which favours the 
extension of the definition of the family, in order to allow 
the member states to provide for the family reunification for 
wider categories of the family. Romania would already be al-
lowed under the Directive to use a more inclusive definition; 
the amendment of the Directive is therefore not necessary to 
accommodate this policy preference. Because Romania specifi-
cally argues for the original list of eligible family members to 
be widened, Romania is coded as wanting the Directive to be 
less restrictive. Czech Republic is the only country asking for 
clarification. The Czech Republic states that the rules on eli-
gible family members are adequate and broad enough in terms 
of inclusiveness, but that the definitions used in the Directive 
could be more precise. 
5 Rules on fraud
Question 10 of the Commission concerns fraud in the context 
of applications for family reunification within the scope of the 
Directive. 
In the first sub-question the Commission asks whether there is 
clear evidence of problems of fraud and how big the problem 
is. Only 5 out of the 24 member states report that they have 
evidence on the nature and scale of fraud (CZ, FI, IT, NL, PT). 
Strikingly, none of the member states quote comprehensive 
statistical data concerning the occurrence of fraud. 
The Netherlands asserts on this issue that the importance of 
statistical data is limited, as ‘it is impossible to make a reli-
able estimate of the total scope of the problem on the basis 
of the data we have.’ However, despite a lack of quantitative 
data regarding the nature and scale of fraud, the Netherlands 
conclude that ‘fraud and abuse take many forms and are wide-
spread.’ It is curious to claim that there is no evidence on the 
scale of fraud and to conclude in the next paragraph that it 
is widespread. To substantiate this statement, the Netherlands 
provides the example of applications for family reunification 
of Somali non-relatives. The Netherlands does not provide any 
information regarding the nature of this fraud, such as for ex-
ample whether forged documents were used. Neither does the 
Netherlands refer to any statistics on the scale of this detected 
fraud. Instead, the Netherlands reports a higher number of 
rejected applications, without linking those rejected applica-
tions to fraud. The Czech Republic comments that most cases 
of fraud have been found in the context of applications for 
family reunification of mobile EU citizens. Most of the fraud 
within the scope of the Directive regards false documents 
proving family relationships, such as marriage and birth cer-
tificates. Finland submits that a common form of abuse con-
sists of providing false information regarding circumstances 
that affect residence permits, such as the reasons for contract-
ing a marriage or child custody arrangements. This is, accord-
ing to Finland, partly unrelated to the documents produced 
in applications. Italy and Portugal do mention the existence 
of problems with fraud, but admit that there is no data to sup-
port this.
In the second sub-question the Commission asks whether rules 
on interviews and investigations, including DNA testing, can 
be instrumental to solving problems of fraud. The answers pro-
vided by the member states on this question each have their 
own focus. Many member states, such as for example Latvia, 
indicate that interviews and investigations are a useful tool, 
but do not answer the question whether rules on interviews 
and investigations would be useful. Of the 16 countries that 
answered the question, 5 countries stated the Directive should 
remain as it is (DE, EL, HU, LU, NL). The Netherlands specifical-
ly address the issue of rules, and considers that no procedural 
rules should be laid down as techniques constantly develop. 
The Dutch proposal for the definition of ‘marriage of convenience’ would mean 
that marriages would be considered fraud even if residence rights were a mere 
cursory consideration in getting married. 
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In the third sub-question the Commission asks whether rules 
on interviews and investigations should be laid down at EU 
level. This question yielded mixed responses from the mem-
ber states. Five member states favour EU rules on interviews 
and investigations (BU, CY, CZ, PT, RO). Bulgaria argues that 
only through EU rules will the principles of proportionality 
and respect for private and family life be respected in practice. 
Portugal also favours rules coordinated at EU level to ensure a 
harmonised procedure, but these rules must not compromise 
the sovereignty of the member states. In the opinion of seven 
member states, the combat of fraud and abuse should remain 
a domestic competence (AT, FI, DE, EL, LV, LT, MT, NL). Greece 
feels that rules on interviews and investigations at EU level 
would probably restrict the competence of the member states 
to combat fraud, where actually flexibility is required. 
The Netherlands fears that rules laid down at EU level would 
limit the scope for investigations. But, the Netherlands does 
propose to change the definition currently laid down in the 
Directive. In the definition of a marriage of convenience 
(MOC), the Directive currently defines MOC as a marriage 
contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring residence rights.25 
The Netherlands proposes to delete the word ‘sole’, so that the 
definition of MOC would be: a marriage contracted with the 
purpose of enabling the person concerned to enter or reside 
in a member state. Such a definition would make the Directive 
more restrictive, as it would mean that marriages would be 
considered fraud even if residence rights were a mere cursory 
consideration in getting married.26 Strictly speaking, this an-
swer is not directly about common rules on interviews and 
investigations to combat fraud, but is rather related to what 
constitutes a MOC, but as the Dutch government has brought 
forward this point in the context of fraud, it is included in the 
analysis here. 
6  The effectiveness of integration measures to 
facilitate integration
Question 5 concerns integration measures. The Commission 
seeks to find out whether integration measures efficiently 
serve the purpose of integration and which measures are most 
effective, whether it would be useful to further define these 
measures at EU level, whether pre-entry integration measures 
are recommended and how it can be prevented that these mea-
sures will lead to an undue barrier for family reunification. 
This question was selected because a majority of countries (11 
out of the 19 countries that answered the question) agree with 
the Dutch position that the Directive should be made more re-
strictive. 
25 article 16(2) family reunification directive.
26 h. wray, an ideal husband ? marriage of convenience, moral gate-keeping 
and immigration to the uk. 8(3-4) european journal of migration and law, 
2006, p. 304.
In question 5a, the Commission implicitly asks for evidence on 
the efficiency and effectiveness of integration measures. Only 
3 out of the 24 member states comment in some way on the ef-
ficiency and effectiveness of integration measures (DE, DK,NL). 
Out of the three member states that do provide some form of 
evidence, two governments (DE, NL) state that they have intro-
duced pre-entry integration requirements in their domestic 
legislation, and comment on the effectiveness of these mea-
sures.
The Netherlands first clearly states that it has evidence on the 
effectiveness of integration measures. It mentions that ‘a range 
of evaluations have shown that there is a broad support for 
integration measures.’ However this statement is not substan-
tiated with references to reports or research. Specifically on 
the effectiveness of pre-entry integration measures, the Dutch 
government points out that the prospective migrants who are 
obliged to pass the pre-entry exam consider this a useful prep-
aration for their move to the Netherlands. Also this finding 
is not supported by any cited studies, which is problematic as 
it would be important to see how the research deals with the 
measurement error caused by social desirability. Germany also 
claims that it has evidence for the effectiveness of integration 
measures. The German contribution refers to an initial survey 
which shows that the immigrants who learn German in their 
country of origin integrate more easily in German society. 27 
This study does however not include an analysis on the effec-
tiveness of the pre-entry integration exam for the integration 
in German society. The Danish government states that a report 
commissioned by the government shows that Danish language 
skills are considered essential for a person to be able to relate to 
politics and the Danish society in general. Although the state-
ments provided are more normative than factual, the Danish 
government does claim that it has evidence. The Danish contri-
bution does not say anything specifically on the effectiveness 
of integration measures for the integration of family migrants. 
Overall, the member states that attempt to provide evidence 
on the efficiency and effectiveness of (pre-entry) integration 
measures, point to evidence which often does not specifically 
concerns family reunification. The assertion that language 
proficiency facilitates integration moreover does not automati-
cally show that there is a relationship between pre-entry inte-
gration measures and integration.
It is important to determine whether there is evidence on 
the effectiveness of integration measures, as the Commission 
27 the german government states in their contribution that this survey would be 
attached to the green Paper, but on the website of the commission it is not 
published. the german government most likely refers to: unterrichtung durch 
die Bundesregierung, Bericht über die evaluierung des Nachweises einfacher 
deutschkenntnisse beim ehegattennachzug nach dem aufenthaltsgesetz – 
sprachlern- und sprachtestangebote, visumverfahren, Drucksache 17/3090, 
2010.
Groenboek gezinshereniging
Eleven member states, including the Netherlands, argue that integration policy is 
a national competence.
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contends that the admissibility of such measures depends 
on whether the purpose of facilitating integration of the 
family member in the host society is achieved.28 In case the 
member states would be able to produce convincing evidence 
on the effectiveness of integration measures, most likely 
the Commission would support possible amendments of the 
Directive specifying and elaborating the provision on inte-
gration measures in the Directive. However, in the absence of 
such evidence, the Commission will most likely not be eager 
to grant the member states more leeway in formulating (pre-
entry) integration measures.
In question 5b, the Commission asks whether integration mea-
sures should be further defined at EU level. The responses to 
these questions are mixed. Eleven member states, including 
the Netherlands, argue that integration policy is a national 
competence and therefore integration measures should not 
be further defined at EU level. Germany and Czech Republic 
believe that under the current wording of Article 7(2) of the 
Directive, pre-entry integration measures are permissible, but 
that it would be useful for it to be worded less ambiguously in 
order to make sure that these measures can be defended be-
fore the Court of Justice of the European Union. Greece and 
Poland point at the need for individual consideration of appli-
cations and would not favour amendments which would make 
the measures obligatory. Cyprus, Estonia and Portugal believe 
the Directive could be clearer on the meaning of integration 
measures. 
In question 5c, the Commission specifically asks whether there 
should be pre-entry integration measures and what could be 
done to prevent pre-entry integration measures becoming a 
barrier to family reunification. Eleven member states argue 
that member states should have the option to impose pre-entry 
integration measures. Nine of those 11 member states would 
like to be able to impose pre-entry integration measures even 
though they do not have any evidence that these integration 
measures facilitate the integration of family migrants in their 
society. It seems that these member states see integration mea-
sures as a means to restrict immigration rather than to pro-
mote integration. Germany points at their hardship clause as 
a mechanism to guarantee proportionality. The Netherlands 
argues it is up to the domestic implementation to ensure that 
the requirements do not become an undue barrier for family 
28 com(2008)610 final, p. 7-8. cf. de vries argues that the purpose of integra-
tion measures not necessarily needs to be the improvement of the integration 
in the host society of the individual, but that the purpose may also be the 
improvement of the integration of immigrants in the host country in general. if 
that view is correct, evidence of the effectiveness of integration measures on 
individuals is less relevant. this would also mean that it would not be possible 
to provide empirical evidence of the relationship between integration measu-
res for a small group and integration of immigrants in society in general. see 
k. de vries, integration at the border: the dutch act on integration abroad in 
relation to international immigration law, Phd dissertation, 2012, p. 123.
reunification. Six member states oppose pre-entry integration 
measures. Portugal argues that there is no evidence that the 
pre-entry integration measures facilitate integration. Romania 
and Bulgaria point to the importance of the right to family re-
unification and oppose pre-entry integration measures.
7  The effectiveness of an age requirement to 
combat forced marriages
In question 2, the Commission asks whether it is justified to re-
quire spouses to be at least 21 years old, as a way of preventing 
forced marriages. Article 4(5) of the Directive gives member 
states the option to require both the sponsor and the spouse 
to be older than the age of majority, setting a maximum of 21. 
The rationale is that the older both partners are, the less likely 
a forced marriage would be. The Commission asks whether 
there is evidence on the problem of forced marriages. This 
question was selected for analysis because a majority of the 
member states did not agree with the Dutch proposal that the 
Directive should be made more restrictive (only three other 
countries agreed with the Netherlands).
Nineteen member states indicate that they have no evidence 
of the problem of forced marriages. Only five member states 
have indicated that there is such evidence (DE, DK, NL, SE, UK). 
The contribution of the Netherlands states that there is evi-
dence, but that no large scale studies on the effectiveness of the 
age requirement for family reunification for the prevention 
of forced marriages have been conducted. Several reports are 
quoted, but these reports either do not quantify the problem 
or are not related to family reunification.29 The Dutch govern-
ment refers to a German survey30, and states that it is plausible 
to assume that the situation in both countries is comparable. 
It however does not list the limitations of the German survey, 
which are outlined below. The Dutch government does not pro-
vide any quantitative evidence on the problem of forced mar-
riages nor on the relationship between the age requirement 
and forced marriages. 
The Danish government notes that there is evidence, but that 
this evidence is not clear and complete. The response does list 
a few statistics, such as the number of honour-related crimes 
reported to the police. The government does not substantiate 
whether these cases are in any way related to forced marriages 
and family reunification. The government furthermore states 
29  for example the wodc report on forced marriages does not in any way re-
flect on the effectiveness of an age requirement. see wodc, huwelijksdwang 
– een verbintenis voor het leven? een verkenning van de aard en aanpak 
van gedwongen huwelijken in Nederland, available via http://www.wodc.nl/
images/volledige-tekst_tcm44-167298.pdf en migratieweb: ve09001794. also 
the other reports are limited with regard to quantifying the problem of forced 
marriages and do not at all elaborate on the relationship between the age 
requirement and the perceived reduction of forced marriages.
30  see footnote 18.
The Dutch government does not provide any quantitative evidence on the 
problem of forced marriages nor on the relationship between the age requirement 
and forced marriages. 
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that in a four-year period 235 applications for family reunifi-
cation were rejected on the ground of perceived forced mar-
riages. However, the Danish government notes that marriages 
between cousins are automatically rejected and registered as 
forced marriages. Denmark does not provide any evidence on 
the effectiveness of the 24-year age requirement against forced 
marriages.
Germany refers to a survey, which showed that in 2008, 3400 
counselling cases regarding forced marriages were registered.31 
According to the survey, almost all persons covered by the sur-
vey have an immigrant background. From this information 
it can, however, not be inferred that those counselling cases 
have anything to do with family reunification. The fact that 
almost all persons covered by the survey have an immigrant 
background does not say anything about the extent to which 
family reunification would contribute to forced marriages and 
even less on the relevance of age in this respect.
Sweden notes that it has clear evidence of forced marriages, 
but the number of registered cases by the Migration Board is 
limited.32 As the age requirement in Sweden is 18, the statistics 
therefore do not provide any insight in the effectiveness of a 
higher age requirement.
The government of the United Kingdom mentions that the 
age requirement has been lowered from 21 to 18 years after 
a ruling of the Supreme Court.33 In terms of evidence, the gov-
ernment’s contribution refers to the findings of the Forced 
Marriage Unit, which provided advice and support in almost 
1500 cases in 2011. The contribution states that research 
showed that in 2009 there were 5000-8000 cases of forced mar-
riage in England. The source of this research is not disclosed 
in the contribution. Both figures are not specifically related to 
applications for family reunification. 
Curiously the Commission does not explicitly ask for evidence 
of whether the age requirement is actually an effective mech-
anism to combat forced marriages. The contributions of the 
member states show that there is very limited evidence of the 
problem of forced marriages. This could be explained by the 
fact that it is difficult to prove forced marriages. However in the 
contributions of the member states there is no evidence at all 
on the effectiveness of the age requirement in the prevention 
of forced marriages. In this regard it is striking that the United 
Kingdom does not refer to a report by Professor Marianne 
Hester et al. (2007), which was actually commissioned by the 
Home Office, in which the authors argue that it is unlikely that 
31 Bundesministerium für familie, senioren, frauen und jugend, 
Zwangsverheiratung in deutschland – anzahl und analyse von 




32 only 8 cases in one year.
33 [2011] uksc 45.
increasing the age requirement from 18 to 21 years old would 
prevent forced marriages.34 Actually, the report mentions that 
raising the age requirement could lead to counterproductive 
effects, as young British brides could be forced to join their 
husband in his country of origin, only increasing the depen-
dency.35 This is the only report which specifically addresses the 
effectiveness of an age requirement for family reunification in 
the prevention of forced marriages and it played an important 
role in the reasoning of the UK Supreme Court. No member 
state made a reference to this report.
With the possibility for the member states to require a mini-
mum age of 21, the Directive allows for the possibility to limit 
the right to family reunification even if the member states can-
not substantiate the effectiveness of this requirement. Despite 
the lack of evidence, fourteen member states are in favour of 
maintaining an age requirement higher than the age of major-
ity. Only five of these countries state that they have evidence 
to support this.
8 Subsidiary protection and family reunification
Question 8 concerns the family reunification of holders of 
international protection. Question 8a refers to whether hold-
ers of subsidiary protection should be within the scope of the 
Directive. If so, the Commission asks in question 8b whether 
subsidiary protection holders should fall under the more fa-
vourable regime as is applied to refugees. The question was 
selected for analysis here because a majority of the member 
states agree with the Netherlands that the Directive should be 
made less restrictive on this issue (11 out of the 17 countries 
that answered the question). 
Currently the Directive applies to recognised refugees, but not 
to holders of subsidiary protection.36 Some member states, like 
the Netherlands, do not distinguish between refugees and 
holders of subsidiary protection. For that reason in Dutch legis-
lation there is no distinction between refugees and subsidiary 
protection holders with regard to family reunification. In the 
EU context, the Netherlands proposes to apply the same rules 
on family reunification for refugees to holders of subsidiary 
protection. Eleven member states agree with the Netherlands. 
Germany takes the view that there should be a flexible regime 
in which subsidiary protection holders should be within the 
scope of the Directive if it is to be expected that they will re-
main in the member state. Six member states would like to 
keep subsidiary protection holders outside the scope of the 
Directive. Czech Republic points out that subsidiary protec-
34 m. hester, k. chantler, g. gangoli, j. devgon, s. sharma & a. singleton, 
forced marriage: the risk factors and the effect of raising the minimum age for 
a sponsor, and of leave to enter the uk as a spouse or fiancé(e), 2007, availa-
ble via http://www.bris.ac.uk/sps/research/projects/completed/2007/rk6612/
rk6612finalreport.pdf.
35 ibid., p. 21. 
36 article 3(2)(c) directive 2003/86.
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Eleven member states agree with the Dutch proposal to apply the same rules on 
family reunification for refugees to holders of subsidiary protection. 
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tion is temporary by nature and should therefore remain 
outside the scope of the Directive. According to the Czech 
Republic, family reunification of subsidiary protection holders 
should be possible, but it should be a national competence. The 
strongest opponent of the inclusion of subsidiary protection 
holders in the scope of the Directive is Malta. This can be ex-
plained by the fact that Malta grants a relatively large number 
of subsidiary protection statuses compared to the number of 
refugee statuses granted.37 For that reason, Malta would be af-
fected by the inclusion of subsidiary protection holders more 
than other countries. Seven member states did not express any 
opinion on this question.
The Commission furthermore asks whether subsidiary protec-
tion holders should enjoy the more favourable regime which 
is applicable to refugees (Q8b). As mentioned above, in the 
Netherlands there is no distinction between refugee status 
and subsidiary protection status and it is in this light that the 
Dutch government proposes to also apply the more favourable 
regime to subsidiary protection holders. From the ten mem-
ber states which agreed with the Netherlands that subsidiary 
protection holders should be within the scope of the Directive, 
four would also like to see the more favourable regime appli-
cable. Table 1 illustrates that three member states are in favour 
of including subsidiary protection holders within the scope 
of the Directive, but oppose applying the more favourable re-
gime. Slovakia is the only country which explicitly explains 
why they do support the inclusion of subsidiary protection 
holders in the scope of the Directive but do not support apply-
ing the more favourable regime. They argue that placing sub-
sidiary protection holders under the more favourable regime 
would place an undue burden on the welfare system.
Table 1 countries’ responses to whether subsidiary 
protection holders should be within the scope of the 
directive (Q8a) compared to responses on whether a more 
favourable regime should apply (Q8b) 
              Within the scope of the Directive?





































37 in malta in 2011, 78% of the international protection statuses granted are for 
subsidiary protection. the average rate in all the member states that have 
contributed to the public consultation is 45%. data obtained from eurostat.
9 Refugees and family reunification
Three sub-questions concern the specific regime applying to 
refugees. Question 9a relates to the option that the member 
states have to require that family relationships predate entry 
for the more favourable regime to apply. Question 9b concerns 
the definition of the family. Question 9c addresses the three-
month time limit for refugees’ applications to fall under the 
more favourable regime. Question 9 was selected because a ma-
jority of the member states did not agree with the Netherlands 
that the definition of the family should be widened for refu-
gees who apply for family reunification (only three other coun-
tries agreed with the Netherlands). 
According to the Directive, member states may limit the ap-
plication of the more favourable regime to refugees whose fam-
ily relationship predates their entry.38 Fourteen member states 
wish to retain this competence. The Netherlands reasons that 
the rationale behind the more favourable regime was that 
families which were forced to separate can reunite. When the 
relationship is established after entry, this cannot be the case. 
Latvia and Hungary are afraid that abolishing this require-
ment would encourage fraud and abuse. Cyprus is the only 
member state which would like to abolish this requirement. 
Cyprus points out that in particular circumstances refugees 
were not able to create a family in their country of origin for 
the same reasons that urged them to seek asylum, and should 
therefore still be able to form a family. Nine member states did 
not answer this question. 
The Commission asks whether family reunification should be 
ensured for wider categories of family members who are de-
pendent on refugees. In the Netherlands eligible family mem-
bers are spouses, minor children, life partners, foster children 
and adult children.39 This definition is wider than the defini-
tion used in regular family migration policy, in which only 
spouses, registered partners and minor children are eligible.40 
To the question whether the definition in the Directive should 
be widened, the Dutch government answers “yes”. This posi-
tion is shared by three member states.41 It is curious that the 
Netherlands proposes to widen the definition of the family in 
this context, as there are proposals to narrow the definition 
of the family in domestic legislation.42 Twelve member states 
disapprove of widening the definition of the family for fam-
ily reunification of refugees (see Graph 1). Germany proposes a 
flexible approach in which cohabitation in the country of ori-
gin should be the decisive criterion. 
38 article 9(2) directive 2003/86, ve08001724.
39 article 29(e)&(f) vw.
40 with this answer the dutch government anticipates a change in domestic 
legislation which excludes unmarried partners from family reunification.
41 cy, hu, sk.
42 Parliamentary documents ii 2011/12, 32 175, nr. 21, ve12000456.
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Graph 1 Proportion of member states’ answers on whether 
the definition of family should be widened for refugees 
(Q9b)
Under the Directive, member states may limit the more favour-
able regime for refugees to applications made within three 
months after the status was granted.43 The Commission asks 
whether this clause should be maintained. The Netherlands 
believes that it cannot be expected from refugees who just 
obtained their status to comply with the substantive require-
ments from Article 7 of the Directive. However after the three-
month period this can be expected from them, according 
to the Dutch reaction. Eight member states agree with the 
Netherlands that the three-month period should stay in the 
Directive. Five member states do not agree with this. Lithuania 
proposes to make the time period in which the application 
must be submitted as long as the integration program. The ra-
tionale behind this proposal is that a refugee cannot be expect-
ed to comply with the substantive requirements if he or she 
has not yet properly integrated. Cyprus also opposes the three-
month period because other factors might make it impossible 
for refugees to file an application in such a short time period.
Table 2 illustrates that member states which answered the 
question on refugee family reunification generally oppose 
amendments in the Directive that would place fewer restric-
tions on the family reunification of refugees. Cyprus is the only 
43 article 12(1) directive 2003/86, ve08001724.
country which favours a less restrictive regime. It is surprising 
that in this context the Dutch government actively pleads for 
a more inclusive definition of the family. Other member states, 
e.g. Sweden, just mention the domestic legislation without 
proposing that the Directive should be amended to be in line 
with domestic legislation. The Netherlands is already allowed 
to have more favourable provisions in domestic law, and it is 
unclear what the reasoning behind the proposal is. 
Table 2  the positions of the member states on the 
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10 Restrictions without evidence?
One of the findings from this research is that many mem-
ber states favour or already operate certain requirements for 
family reunification, such as age requirements and pre-entry 
integration tests, without quantitative evidence that such 
measures are actually an effective mechanism to achieve the 
sought objective. 
It should be noted that in any decision within the scope of the 
Directive, the principle of proportionality must be respected. 
Furthermore, the competence to impose substantive require-
ments on applicants must be strictly interpreted.44 It is ques-
tionable whether without evidence of the effectiveness of 
integration measures, such requirements are permissible in 
individual cases. 
As mentioned above, the UK Supreme Court has already ruled 
that an age requirement of 21 years was incompatible with the 
44 case c-578/08 Chakroun v Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken [2010] ecr 
i-1839, para. 43. in his note in jurisprudentie vreemdelingenrecht (jv 
2010/177, ve10000350), groenendijk argues that the principles set out in 
chakroun should be applied for all substantive requirements, including the 
pre-entry integration requirement.
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  No, it should stay as it is now
  Yes, it should be widened
  there should be a flexible approach
  No answer
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principle of proportionality enshrined in Article 8(2) ECHR.45 
This ruling was based on the lack of evidence of the effective-
ness of the age requirement in combating forced marriages. 
The substantive requirements in the Directive could as well 
be challenged on the same basis. The finding that the member 
states are not able to substantiate the effectiveness of substan-
tive requirements therefore invites questions on the legitima-
cy of the imposed substantive requirements. As in this context 
this is a matter of EU law, domestic judges could, or depend-
ing on the status of the court should, request guidance on 
this issue in a preliminary reference procedure at the Court. 
A possible preliminary reference could read: Do Article 4(5) 
and Article 7(2) of the Family Reunification Directive preclude 
domestic legislation requiring applicants for family reunifica-
tion to comply with respectively age and pre-entry integration 
requirements where the member state is not able to provide 
evidence on the effectiveness of these requirements on respec-
tively the aim of preventing forced marriages and the aim of 
facilitating integration in the host member state? 
The Dutch government raised the age requirement from 18 to 
21 years in 2010.46 If a case concerning the higher age require-
ment would reach the Dutch courts, this would be a good mo-
ment to ask the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling on 
the matter of maintaining the age requirement without its ef-
fectiveness having been proven.
 
11  The future of the Directive
In the Green Paper, the Commission sketches several possible 
outcomes, namely the modification of the Directive, the estab-
lishment of interpretative guidelines or maintaining the sta-
tus quo. The Commission plays a decisive role in the future of 
the Directive. In EU decision-making, the Commission is the 
only actor that can propose new legislation or revision of exist-
ing legislation. If the Commission does not initiate revision, 
the member states will not be able to amend the Directive.
On 31 May–1 June 2012 a consultation meeting took place 
in Brussels where the Green Paper and the contributions of 
stakeholders were discussed.47 At the end of that meeting 
the Director General of the Commission’s DG Home Affairs, 
Stefano Manservisi, said that the Commission does not intend 
to initiate revision of the Directive. Instead the Commission 
announced that it will closely monitor the implementation 
of the Directive by the member states, which might result in 
infringement proceedings. Furthermore, the Commission is 
planning to produce interpretative guidelines in cooperation 
with the member states and civil society. One of the items on 
45 [2011] uksc 45.
46 royal decree 24.07.2010, staatsblad 306, ve10001128.
47 see http://www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.events-and-activities-european-
integration-forum-7.
which the Commission plans to issue interpretative guide-
lines is pre-entry integration measures. This is interesting as 
the member states’ responses to the Green Paper did not high-
light the need for interpretive guidelines on this issue. The 
Commission might feel that actually these measures are not 
permissible under the Directive because the member states 
are unable to substantiate the effectiveness of compulsory pre-
entry integration measures. It is therefore highly questionable 
whether the wish of a majority of the member states to be able 
to impose pre-entry integration requirements on family mem-
bers48 will be reflected in the interpretative guidelines of the 
Commission.49
During the consultation meeting, Manservisi stressed that the 
main objective of the Directive is to allow for family reunifica-
tion, and not to set up barriers.50 The fact that the Commission 
takes a reserved position on renegotiating the Directive can 
only be explained by the fear that the right to family reunifi-
cation would be weakened in the process. This was expressly 
recognised in the Swedish response, which stated that it ‘is of 
the opinion that the Directive best be left the way it is, since 
it is difficult to predict the outcome of a reviewing process, 
which might result in stricter provisions being introduced.’ 
During the consultation meeting, many NGOs also expressed 
their preference to not reopen the Directive, motivated by the 
fear that their policy preferences would not be realised. In case 
the Commission remains unwilling to reopen the negotiations 
on the Directive in the absence of a clear consensus among the 
member states, according to the findings of this article, restric-
tive amendments such as proposed by the Dutch government 
are unlikely to be included in the Directive.
12 Conclusion
The research question addressed in this article was how the 
response of the Netherlands to the Green Paper compares to 
the contributions of the other member states. In order to an-
swer this research question, a systematic comparison was con-
ducted of member states’ answers to the questions asked by the 
Commission. 
It was infeasible to categorise all member states by the level 
of restrictiveness of their answers, nor was it possible to com-
pare the views of the Dutch government on issues outside the 
scope of the questions asked by the Commission, considering 
that the other member states did not address those issues in 
their responses. Furthermore, it was not possible to identify 
certain member states which generally shared the views ex-
48 see section 4.
49 see the submission of the commission in the strike-out cjeu case c-155/11 
PPu imran, ve11001451.
50 summary report on the seventh meeting of the european integration forum: 
Public hearing on the right to family reunification of third country Nationals 
living in the eu.
The UK Supreme Court has already ruled that an age requirement of 21 years 
was incompatible with the principle of proportionality enshrined in Article 8(2) 
ECHR.
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pressed by the Netherland. The methodology developed was, 
however, able to show the Dutch position on the issues raised 
in the Commission’s Green Paper in relation to the views of 
other member states. When the Dutch views were compared 
with the opinions of the other member states, in 12 out of the 
20 substantive questions, the view held by the Netherlands was 
the most common view among all member states. Only in 8 
out of 20 questions the Netherlands was in a minority posi-
tion. This indicated that the Netherlands does not stand com-
pletely alone its views on the answers to the questions posed 
by the Commission. In order to grasp more fully where the 
Netherlands stands in relation to the other member states, six 
issues were selected for in-depth analysis. This showed that the 
Dutch answers to the Commission’s questions were very mixed 
in terms of the proposed future of the Directive and in terms of 
which member states supported the Dutch position. 
The Netherlands pleaded that the Directive should not be 
amended in fields where it considered that the member states 
currently have a wide discretionary competence under the 
Directive. On several other questions the Dutch government 
proposed to make the Directive more restrictive, for example 
by requiring the sponsor and the family migrant to be at least 
24 years old. In the field of family reunification for holders of 
international protection, the Netherlands argued for less re-
strictive provisions in the Directive. The responses of the other 
member states on these issues were mixed. The member states 
did largely agree with standpoint of the Dutch government 
with regard to pre-entry integration measures, which, accord-
ing to a majority of member states, should continue to be per-
missible. In many questions, especially where the Netherlands 
did not express the wish to change the Directive, the Dutch 
standpoint was shared with a majority of the member states. 
Although some of the Dutch government’s (restrictive) pro-
posals are shared by other member states, this does not mean 
that it will result in the Directive being amended. In the Green 
Paper itself, the member states were not asked whether they 
would like to reopen the negotiations of the Directive. From 
the answers of the member states, no emerging consensus on 
this issue can be inferred. The reactions on the Green Paper 
by the member states therefore do not put clear pressure on 
the Commission to reopen the negotiations of the Directive. 
If there would have been such consensus, and if the member 
states would have clearly expressed the wish to reopen the 
Directive, it is not likely that the Commission would have ig-
nored such a message. Without such signals from the member 
states, it is not very likely that the Commission will take ini-
tiative to reopen the negotiation of the Directive. In the ab-
sence of legislative action by the Commission, the Netherlands 
will not be able to incorporate its restrictive proposals in the 
Directive. Based on the findings in this research, it is unlikely 
that interpretative guidelines to be issued by the Commission 
will be in line with the restrictive proposals of the Dutch gov-
ernment.51 Instead, it seems more likely that the Commission 
will consider starting infringement proceedings against the 
Netherlands for example on the issue of excessive administra-
tive fees. 
Another finding of the analysis of the member states’ respons-
es to the Commission’s Green Paper was the inability of the 
member states to provide evidence on the effectiveness of inte-
gration measures, the age requirements and the occurrence of 
fraud and abuse. It is questionable whether restrictions on the 
right to family reunification are in line with the proportional-
ity principle in case that there is no evidence that the restric-
tions are effective in reaching the desired objective.
Most of the proposals of the Dutch government to make the 
Directive more restrictive are not supported by a majority of 
the member states, and the Commission, in the absence of 
consensus among the member states, does not appear eager to 
make more restrictive measures possible. Therefore the restric-
tive Dutch proposals are unlikely to be realised in the near fu-
ture.
Appendix – list of sub-questions
Q1a Are these criteria (reasonable prospect for the right of 
permanent residence at the time of application as regulated 
in Article 3 and a waiting period until reunification can actu-
ally take place as regulated in Article 8) the correct approach 
and the best way to qualify the sponsors?
Q1b Are these criteria (reasonable prospect for the right of 
permanent residence at the time of application as regulated in 
Article 3 and a waiting period until reunification can actu-
ally take place as regulated in Article 8) the correct approach 
and the best way to qualify the sponsors?
Q2a Is it legitimate to have a minimum age for the spouse 
which differs from the age of majority in a Member State? Are 
there other ways of preventing forced marriages within the 
context of family reunification and if yes, which?
*Q2b Do you have clear evidence of the problem of forced mar-
riages? If yes how big is this problem (statistics) and is it related 
51 the dutch minister on immigration, integration and asylum stated that he is 
happy that the commission will use the findings of an expert group on impro-
vements of the implementation of directive 2003/86 in formulating interpre-
tative guidelines. even though this expert commission will consist of public 
officials from the member states, it is unclear whether the conclusions from 
this commission will support the views held by the dutch government and 
whether the interpretative guidelines to be issued by the commission will be in 
line with the recommendations by the expert commission. see Parliamentary 
documents ii 2011/12, 32 175, nr. 36, p. 11, ve12001556.
If the Commission does not initiate revision, the member states will not be able 
to amend the Directive
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to the rules on family reunification (to fix a different mini-
mum age than the age of majority)?
Q3 Do you see an interest in maintaining those standstill 
clauses which are not used by Member States, such as the one 
concerning children older than 15?
Q4 Are the rules on eligible family members adequate and 
broad enough to take into account the different definitions of 
family existing other than that of the nuclear family?
*Q5a Do these measures efficiently serve the purpose of inte-
gration? How can this be assessed in practice? Which integra-
tion measures are most effective in that respect?
Q5b Would you consider it useful to further define these mea-
sures [integration measures] at EU level?
Q5c Would you recommend pre-entry measures? If so, how can 
safeguards be introduced in order to ensure that they do not 
de facto lead to undue barriers for family reunification (such as 
disproportionate fees or requirements) and take into account 
individual abilities such as age, illiteracy, disability, education-
al level?
Q6 In view of its application, is it necessary and justified to 
keep such a derogation in the Directive to provide for a three 
year waiting period as from the submission of the application?
Q7 Should specific rules foresee the situation when the re-
maining validity of the sponsor’s residence permit is less than 
one year, but to be renewed?
Q8a Should the family reunification of third country nationals 
who are beneficiaries of subsidiary protection be subject to the 
rules of the Family reunification Directive??
Q8b Should beneficiaries of subsidiary protection benefit from 
the more favourable rules of the Family reunification Directive 
which exempt refugees from meeting certain requirements 
(accommodation, sickness insurance, stable and regular re-
sources)?
Q9a Should Member States continue to have the possibility to 
limit the application of the more favourable provisions of the 
Directive to refugees whose family relationships predate their 
entry to the territory of a Member State?
Q9b Should family reunification be ensured for wider catego-
ries of family members who are dependent on the refugees, if 
so to which degree?
Q9c Should refugees continue to be required to provide evi-
dence that they fulfil the requirements regarding accommo-
dation, sickness insurance and resources if the application for 
family reunification is not submitted within a period of three 
months after granting the refugee status?
*Q10a Do you have clear evidence of problems of fraud? How 
big is the problem (statistics)?
Q10b Do you think rules on interviews and investigations, in-
cluding DNA testing, can be instrumental to solve them? 
Q10c Would you consider it useful to regulate more specifically 
these interviews or investigations at EU level? If so, which type 
of rules would you consider?
*Q11a Do you have clear evidence of problems of marriages of 
convenience? Do you have statistics of such marriages (if de-
tected)? 
Q11b Are they [MoC] related to the rules of the Directive? Could 
the provisions in the Directive for checks and inspections be 
more effectively implemented, and if so, how?
Q12 Should administrative fees payable in the procedure be 
regulated? If so, should it be in a form of safeguards or should 
more precise indications be given?
Q13 Is the administrative deadline laid down by the Directive 
for examination of the application justified?
Q14 How could the application of these horizontal clauses be 
facilitated and ensured in practice?
*evidence/no evidence questions
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Appendix B – tables with all responses
Table B1 coding of countries’ responses to all substantive sub-questions
Stay the same more restrictive Less restrictive Clarification No answer
Q1a 
At, BE, CY, DE, EE, 
EL, FI, FR, LU, mt, 
pL, SK
CZ, DK, NL BG, HU, pt LV, Lt, RO It, SE, UK
Q1b 
At, BE, BG, CY, EE, 
EL, FI, FR, Lt, mt, 
NL, pL, SK
CZ, DK HU, pt RO
DE, It, LV, LU, SE, 
UK
Q2a
At, BE, CY, EE, FI, 
DE, It, LV, mt, UK
CZ, DK, Lt, NL




At, BE, CY, DK, FR, 
DE, LV, mt, NL
BG, CZ, HU, It, Lt, 
pL, pt, RO, SK
EE, FI, EL, LU, SE, 
UK
Q4
At, BE, BG, CY, DK, 
EE, FI, FR, DE, EE, 
LV, Lt, LU, mt, NL, 
pL, pt,
RO CZ HU, It, SE, UK
Q5b
At, BE, BG, EE, FR, 
HU, LV, Lt, mt, NL, 
SK
CZ, DE, RO CY, EE, pL FI, pt DK, It, LU, SE, UK
Q5c BG, LU
At, BE, CZ, EE, FR, 
DE, EL, LV, mt, NL, 
UK
CY, FI, Lt, pt, RO, 
SK
DK, HU, It, pL, SE
Q6
At, BE, CZ, FR, LV, 
mt, NL
BG, CY, FI, DE, HU, 
Lt, pL, pt, RO
DK, EE, EL, It, LU, 
SK, SE, UK
Q7
At, BE, FI, FR, LV, 
LU
BG, CY, DE, EL, HU, 
Lt, mt, pt, SK, SE
pL CZ, EE, NL, RO DK, It, UK
Q8a
At, BE, CZ, FI, LV, 
mt
BG, CY, EE, FR, DE, 
HU, Lt, NL, pt, RO, 
SK
DK, EL, It, LU, pL, 
SE, UK
Q8b At, HU, LV, Lt, SK BG, CY, FR, NL, RO
BE, CZ, DK, EE, FI, 
DE, EL, It, LU, mt, 
pL, pt, SE, UK
Q9a
At, BE, BG, EE, FI, 
FR, HU, LV, Lt, mt, 
NL, pt, RO, SK
CY
CZ, DK, DE, EL, It, 
LU, pL, SE, UK
Q9b
At, BE, BG, EE, FI, 
FR, LV, Lt, LU, mt, 
pt, RO
CY, HU, NL, SK DE
CZ, DK, EL, It, pL, 
SE, UK
Q9c
At, EE, FR, DE, HU, 
LV, mt, NL, SK
CY, Lt, LU, pt, RO
BE, BG, CZ, DK, FI, 
EL, It, pL, SE, UK
Q10b DE, EL, HU, LU, NL
CZ, DK, LV, mt, pt, 
RO
At, BG, CY, EE, FR
BE, FI, It, Lt, pL, 
SK, SE, UK
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Stay the same more restrictive Less restrictive Clarification No answer
Q10c
At, FI, DE, EL, HU, 
LV, Lt, LU, mt
BE, CZ, NL, pt, RO BG CY, EE, FR
DK, It, pL, SK, SE, 
UK
Q11b
BE, FR, EL, HU, LV, 
Lt, RO
At, BG, DE, It, NL, 
pt
EE
CY, CZ, DK, FI, LU, 
mt, pL, SK, SE, UK
Q12
At, BE, CY, CZ, EE, 
FI, FR, DE, EL, HU, 
LV, Lt, LU, mt, NL, 
SK
BG, RO pL, pt DK, It, SE, UK
Q13
At, BE, BG, CZ, EE, 
FR, EL, Lt, LU, mt, 
NL, pL, SK, SE
FI CY, HU, pt, RO DE DK, It, LV, UK
Q14
At, BE, CZ, FI, FR, 
Lt, LU, mt, NL, RO
CY, pt EE, SK
BG, DK, DE, EL, HU, 
It, LV, pL, SE, UK
Table B2 the relationship between governments’ responses to the existence of evidence of fraud (Q10a) and whether it 
would be useful to have rules at the eu level (10c) 
Stay the same
Change - more 
restrictive 
Change - Less 
restrictive
Clarification No answer 
No evidence
At, DE, EL, HU, Lt, 
LU, mt
BE, RO BG, CY, EE, FR
DK, pL, SE, SK, 
UK
Evidence FI, LV CZ, NL, pt   It
Table B3 the relationship between governments’ responses to the existence of evidence of fraud (Q10a) and whether 
rules on investigations are instrumental to solving it (10b) 
Stay the same
Change - more 
restrictive 
Change - Less 
restrictive
Clarification No answer 
No evidence DE, EL, HU, LU DK, mt, RO  
At, BG, CY, EE, 
FR
BE, Lt, pL, SE, 
SK, UK
Evidence NL CZ, LV, pt   FI, It
Table B4 the relationship between governments’ responses to the existence of evidence of marriages of convenience 
(Q11a) and whether the provisions in the directive could be more effectively implemented (11b) 
Stay the same
Change - more 
restrictive 
Change - Less 
restrictive
Clarification No answer 
No evidence
BE, EL, FR, HU, 
Lt, RO
At, BG, DE, NL, 
pt
 EE
CY, CZ, LU, mt, 
pL, SE, UK
Evidence LV It   DK, FI, SK
